UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

6-16-2017

State v. Johnson Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt.
43822

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Johnson Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 43822" (2017). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All. 6599.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/6599

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For
more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
DAVID LEON JOHNSON,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
______________________________)

NO. 43822
MINIDOKA COUNTY NO.
CR 2005-2497

________________________

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
________________________
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF MINIDOKA
________________________
HONORABLE MICHAEL R. CRABTREE
District Judge
________________________
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. #6555
ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #7259
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985

ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534

ATTORNEY FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................... iii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ....................................................................................... 1
Nature of the Case ............................................................................................... 1
Statement of the Facts and
Course of Proceedings ......................................................................................... 2
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL .............................................................................. 3
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................. 4
I. The District Court’s Instruction Informing The Jury Pool That A Prior
Trial Had Occurred, That Mr. Johnson’s Prior Convictions Were
Overturned, And That The Idaho Supreme Court Had Remanded His Case
For A New Trial Violated Mr. Johnson’s Constitutional Right To A Fair
Trial Before An Impartial Jury ....................................................................... 4
A. The Issue Was Not Waived ..................................................................... 4
B. The District Court’s Instruction Informing The Jury Pool That A Prior
Trial Had Occurred, That Mr. Johnson’s Prior Convictions Were
Overturned, And That The Idaho Supreme Court Had Remanded His
Case For A New Trial Violated Mr. Johnson’s Constitutional Right To
A Fair Trial Before An Impartial Jury ...................................................... 7
C. Harmless Error ......................................................................................... 9
II. The District Court Erred In Denying The Motion For A Mistrial Made
After The State Improperly Commented On Mr. Johnson’s Invocation Of
His Right To Silence .................................................................................... 10
III. The District Court Erred In Denying The Motion For A Mistrial After The
Court Erroneously Allowed Mr. Wilson To Testify With The Aid Of The
Report, Despite The Fact That His Memory Was Not Refreshed By The
Contents Of A Report, And After Finding That The State’s Failure To
Disclose The Report Amounted To A Discovery Violation .......................... 12
A. The Report Was Improperly Used During Mr. Wilson’s Testimony
Because It Did Not Refresh His Recollection And The Resulting
Motion For A Mistrial Should Have Been Granted ................................. 12

i

B. The State Committed A Discovery Violation When It Failed To
Provide Defense Counsel A Copy Of Mr. Wilson’s Time Entry Report
And The Resulting Motion For A Mistrial Should Have Been Granted... 17
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 19
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ...................................................................................... 20

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Federal Cases
20th Century Wear, Inc., v. Sanmark–Stardust, Inc., 747 F.2d 81 (2d Cir.1984) ........................ 13
United States v. Gonzalez, 214 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2000) ............................................................9
United States v. Olsen, 704 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2013) .................................................................9
State Cases
Baker v. Boren, 129 Idaho 885 (Ct. App. 1997) ................................................................... 12, 13
Davidson v. Beco Corp., 112 Idaho 560 (Ct. App. 1986) .............................................................7
Dunlap v. State, 159 Idaho 280 (2015) ........................................................................................9
Harley-Davidson Motor Co., Inc. v. Daniel, 244 Ga. 284 (1979) .................................................7
State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53 (2011) ..................................................................................... 11
State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559 (2007).......................................................................................... 16
State v. Lankford, No. 35617, 2016 WL 4010851 (Idaho July 25, 2016) .............................. 6, 8, 9
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010) .........................................................................................11
State v. Pratt, 160 Idaho 248 (2016) ........................................................................................ 4, 6
State v. Sandoval-Tena, 138 Idaho 908 (2003)........................................................................... 16
State v. Shepherd, 124 Idaho 54 (Ct. App. 1993) ....................................................................... 16
State v. Urquhart, 105 Idaho 92 (Ct. App. 1983) ....................................................................... 16
State Rules
Idaho Rules of Evidence 612 ..................................................................................................... 12

iii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Following the remand of his case by the Idaho Supreme Court, Mr. Johnson’s case
proceeded to a second trial. Prior to the start of trial, the jury pool was told, by the district court,
that a prior trial had occurred in 2006 and that following an appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court had
reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. This instruction did not include
any statement to the jury that the prior trial should not be considered and effectively prejudiced
the entire jury panel. After denying a request to draw a new panel, the case proceeded as
planned. Mr. Johnson asserts that allowing the case to be heard by members of this jury pool
violated his constitutional right to a fair trial.
During the trial, Mr. Johnson made two motions for mistrial. The lead detective on the
case, Detective Snarr, testified that he had attempted to interview Mr. Johnson. The detective’s
statement prejudicially persuaded the jury to infer guilt from Mr. Johnson’s previous assertions
of his rights. Following defense counsel’s objection and motion for a mistrial, the district court
provided a curative instruction. Mr. Johnson asserts that the district court erred in denying his
motion for mistrial based on the improperly presented inference of guilt.
Additionally, the State presented the testimony of Scott Wilson, Mr. Johnson’s former
employer. Mr. Wilson admitted to having no memory of the dates or times that Mr. Johnson
worked on the days in question. However, he was allowed to use a report he had created to
“refresh his recollection.” Unfortunately, the report was not disclosed to defense counsel prior to
Mr. Wilson producing it during his testimony, despite the fact that it was created at the request of
the State. Mr. Johnson asserts that the district court abused its discretion in allowing Mr. Wilson
to testify when his recollection had not actually been refreshed, that the State committed a
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discovery violation that prejudiced Mr. Johnson’s ability to prepare for examination of
Mr. Wilson, and that the district court erred in denying the resulting motion for a mistrial.
Finally, Mr. Johnson asserts that the above errors amount to cumulative error.
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State assertions to the contrary.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Johnson’s Appellant’s Brief.

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES1
1. Did the district court’s instruction informing the jury pool that a prior trial had occurred,
that Mr. Johnson’s prior convictions were overturned, and that the Idaho Supreme Court
had remanded the case for a new trial violate Mr. Johnson’s constitutional right to a fair
trial before an impartial jury?
2. Did the district court err in denying the motion for a mistrial made after the State
improperly commented on Mr. Johnson’s invocation of his right to silence?
3. Did the district court err in denying the motion for a mistrial after the court erroneously
allowed Mr. Wilson to testify with the aid of a report, despite the fact that his memory
was not refreshed by the contents of the report, and after finding that the State’s failure to
disclose the report amounted to a discovery violation?
4. Do the errors in Mr. Johnson’s case amount to cumulative error?
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This Reply Brief will not address issue four as the State’s arguments on the issue are
unremarkable and, as such, no response is necessary.
3

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court’s Instruction Informing The Jury Pool That A Prior Trial Had Occurred, That
Mr. Johnson’s Prior Convictions Were Overturned, And That The Idaho Supreme Court Had
Remanded His Case For A New Trial Violated Mr. Johnson’s Constitutional Right To A Fair
Trial Before An Impartial Jury
Mr. Johnson maintains that his constitutional right to a fair trial before an impartial jury
was violated when the jury, which had been prejudicially informed of Mr. Johnson’s previous
conviction for the same charges, was allowed to hear his case.

A.

The Issue Was Not Waived
The State has asserted that when Mr. Johnson passed the jury panel for cause he waived

any claims of actual or implied jury bias. (Respondent’s Brief, p.7.) This assertion is incorrect
for numerous reasons.
First, the case relied upon by the State, State v. Pratt, is not applicable to the present case.
In Pratt, the Idaho Supreme Court found that after a juror made some comments of concern
during voir dire, counsel was able to question the jury panel about any potential related bias and
appeared to be satisfied that no bias existed, as evidenced by his “tactical decision to pass the
jury for cause.” State v. Pratt, 160 Idaho 248, 250 (2016). Mr. Johnson’s case presents a very
different situation.
In the case at hand, there was no ability for counsel to question the jurors regarding any
potential bias from the district court’s statement.

While counsel in Pratt was able to ask

questions that would uncover bias, the jury panel in Mr. Johnson’s case could not be asked about
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potential bias without emphasizing the very information that the jurors should not have been
exposed to, that there had been a prior trial, conviction, and appeal. 2
All of the parties agreed that it would be impossible to question jurors about the implied
bias without increasing the possible prejudice. Once defense counsel’s concerns were brought to
the district court’s attention, the district court agreed that any further mentioning of the previous
trial would be prejudicial and ordered that from that point forward the prior trial would be
referred to as prior proceeding or hearing. (Tr., p.82, L.20 – p.83, L.5.) The district court noted
that “if, in fact, there is prejudice – and I am not presuming that there is, although I understand
defense counsel’s concerns, any further comment of it as a topic would only, I think, serve to
highlight it.” (Tr., p.79, Ls.1-4.) The State also suggested that the jury not be subject to
questioning about the prior trial or appeal: “You Honor, I think that jury – and I don’t know how
you question them from this point on. I think the best thing to do is to stay away from it, because
if you do question them, it could taint them further. If there is any tainting . . . ” (Tr., p.77,
L.25 – p.78, L.5.) Defense counsel’s position was that the only appropriate remedy was to select
a new jury panel, implying that he also thought it would be inappropriate to question the jurors
further about the issue. (Tr., p.81, Ls.13-16.)
Additionally, not only were no questions asked to alleviate counsel’s concerns about bias,
there was no reason to believe that counsel made a tactical decision to pass the jury for cause
based on an assumption that concerns about bias had been alleviated.

Instead, it was obvious

that Mr. Johnson remained very concerned that mentioning the prior trial would only serve to
further bias the jury.

After the jury had been selected, the topic was discussed again and
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Mr. Johnson asserts that the error is similar to a structural error because it could not be cured.
Any attempt to cure the error through questioning or instruction could only serve to increase the
prejudicial effect by further emphasizing the improper information.
5

Mr. Johnson noted that he was still requesting that the prior trial not be mentioned. (Tr., p.460,
Ls.11-21.) The district court reaffirmed its ruling that the parties would not use the word “trial”,
but would refer to the prior trial as a prior hearing or proceeding. (Tr., p.461, L.23 – p.463, L.4.)
It was clear that Mr. Johnson had continuing concerns about the bias created by the district
court’s statement and the jury receiving additional, similar information, and that he did not
abandon the earlier objection.
The facts of Mr. Johnson’s case do not support a conclusion that counsel made a tactical
decision to waive the claim of implied bias because counsel was never able to dispel fears of bias
by questioning potential jurors on the subject or by implying, through later actions, that
Mr. Johnson was abandoning the claim. As such, Pratt is not instructive on the issue.
Further, in Lankford the Idaho Supreme Court did not refuse to address a similar issue
although counsel also, presumably, passed the jury for case. State v. Lankford, No. 35617, 2016
WL 4010851, at 1-5 (Idaho July 25, 2016) (rehearing granted). Instead, the Court addressed the
merits of the issue and found that because the district court did not reveal the outcome of the
prior trial, counsel did not object to the statement, and because the district court properly
questioned the jurors about any possible bias and instructed on the presumption of innocence,
there was not an extreme situation requiring a finding of implied bias. Id. Just as in Lankford,
Mr. Johnson asserts that a review of the merits of his claim is also required.
Finally, Mr. Johnson’s objection was sufficient to preserve the issue and objecting again
at the end of voir dire was unnecessary as the district court had already made a final ruling on the
issue. As soon as the jury pool entered the courtroom, the district court’s decision regarding the
motion to select a new panel was final. There was nothing more that Mr. Johnson could do to
have a new panel selected.
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Mr. Johnson asserts that this issue is similar to a ruling on a motion in limine. The issue
was first brought to the district court’s attention through a motion in limine. It has been a long
standing rule that once a motion in limine has been ruled upon, there is no need to object again at
trial to preserve the issue. Davidson v. Beco Corp., 112 Idaho 560, 563–64, (Ct. App. 1986)
(overruled on other grounds). As was noted in Davidson, “All the purposes of an objection have
already been fulfilled by the proceedings on the motion in limine. The trial court has been
apprised of the possible error in admitting the evidence and has made its ruling, and the record
has been perfected for appeal purposes.” Id. at 563 (quoting Harley-Davidson Motor Co., Inc. v.
Daniel, 244 Ga. 284, 260 S.E.2d 20 (1979)). Requiring Mr. Johnson to reiterate his objection to
the entire jury panel at the end of voir dire would not have made his position more clear and
would have served only to remind the jury that they had been exposed to prejudicial information.
Therefore, Mr. Johnson has not waived the issue.

B.

The District Court’s Instruction Informing The Jury Pool That A Prior Trial Had
Occurred, That Mr. Johnson’s Prior Convictions Were Overturned, And That The Idaho
Supreme Court Had Remanded His Case For A New Trial Violated Mr. Johnson’s
Constitutional Right To A Fair Trial Before An Impartial Jury
The State asserts that “the jury panel in the present case was made aware that there had

been a prior trial and an appeal, but was not told there had been a conviction or finding of guilt.”
(Respondent’s Brief, p.9.) The State’s assertion is erroneous. The jury was told “. . . There was
a prior trial in this case in 2006. Following an appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed and
remanded the case to this court for a new trial. . . .” (R., p.550; Tr. 6/22/11, p.5, Ls.12-15, p.11,
Ls.20-23; Tr. 6/23/11, p.19, Ls.14-17, p.25, Ls.14-16.) This is not a mere statement that there
had been a trial and appeal, but a clear statement that “the Idaho Supreme Court reversed and
remanded the case.” This statement is, for all intents and purposes, the same as saying that
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Mr. Johnson had been convicted and had his conviction overturned on appeal. The statement
was so specific that a juror could not merely assume that there had been a previous hung jury or
a prior mistrial. The jury pool must have understood that Mr. Johnson had been previously
convicted of the charges as there is simply no other conclusion that can be drawn from this
statement. Any other interpretation of the words used would be a logical fallacy.
Next, Mr. Johnson agrees with the State that each case must turn on its own facts in
determining whether an “extreme situation” exists to justify a finding of implied bias. State v.
Lankford, No. 35617, 2016 WL 4010851, at *4 (Idaho July 25, 2016) (rehearing granted);
Respondent’s Brief, p.11.) He asserts that the facts of his case present such an extreme situation.
In support of this assertion, Mr. Johnson presented argument illustrating how the facts of his case
were different than the crucial facts used to find the opposite in Lankford. (See Appellant’s
Brief, pp.19-23.)
Further, the State appears to believe that it was argued on appeal that a curative
instruction should have been given. (Respondent’s Brief, p.12.) However, Mr. Johnson made no
such argument. It was merely pointed out that unlike the jury in Lankford, whether prudent or
not, the jury in Mr. Johnson’s case was not provided a curative instruction. (Appellant’s Brief,
p.22.)
Additionally, the State asserts that Mr. Johnson argued that the prosecutor’s comments
regarding the best course of action somehow prevented voir dire of the jury. (Respondent’s
Brief, p.12.) This was never argued by Mr. Johnson. Instead, Mr. Johnson, again in an effort to
illustrate the differences between Lankford and the case at hand, noted that follow-up questions
about an implied bias were not asked because both parties did not think that such questioning
could cure the taint. (Tr., p.81, Ls.13-16, p.77, L.25 – p.78, L.5; see Appellant’s Brief, p.22.)
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The error in advising jurors of Mr. Johnson’s prior trial, conviction, and appeal for the
same offenses affected his substantial rights and likely affected the outcome of his trial. As
noted in the Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Johnson’s case is clearly distinguishable from both Watkins
and Lankford. Based on the distinctive factual scenario presented in his case, Mr. Johnson
asserts that his case requires a different result. As such, Mr. Johnson’s convictions must be
vacated and his case remanded for a new trial before a fair and impartial jury.

C.

Harmless Error
The State has asserted that “jury bias is not subject to harmless error analysis.”

(Respondent’s Brief, p.6, n.2.) Dunlap states that “Accordingly, ‘[t]he presence of a biased juror
cannot be harmless; the error requires a new trial without a showing of actual prejudice.”’
Dunlap v. State, 159 Idaho 280, 304 (2015) (quoting United States v. Olsen, 704 F.3d 1172, 1189
(9th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Gonzalez, 214 F.3d 1109, 1111 (9th Cir. 2000)).
However, Lankford noted, in articulating the standard of review, that as part of the defendant’s
burden to prove fundamental error, he would be required to prove harmlessness. Lankford, 2016
WL 4010851 at *2. As such, there is a discrepancy in the Idaho Supreme Court’s standards of
review for the issue. Mr. Johnson maintains that the error cannot be harmless, whether that is
because a showing of prejudice is not required or because the State has failed to prove the error
is harmless. Regardless, the State’s has conceded the issue either by directly conceding that the
harmless error standard is not applicable or by failing to present evidence proving that the error
was harmless.
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II.
The District Court Erred In Denying The Motion For A Mistrial Made After The State
Improperly Commented On Mr. Johnson’s Invocation Of His Right To Silence
In response to a question from the State, Detective Snarr testified that he had attempted to
interview Mr. Johnson.

The response prejudicially persuaded the jury to infer guilt from

Mr. Johnson’s previous assertions of his rights. This testimony formed the basis for a motion for
a mistrial. The district court found that the testimony was prejudicial, but denied the motion for
a mistrial. Instead, the district court provided a flawed curative instruction that was insufficient
to cure the prejudice. Mr. Johnson maintains that the motion for a mistrial was erroneously
denied.
The State failed to address several of Mr. Johnson’s arguments presented within this
issue. Presumably, the lack of argument on these issues is a concession by the State that
Detective Snarr’s testimony was a violation of Mr. Johnson’s constitutional rights.
Specifically, the State did not address Mr. Johnson’s argument that the limiting
instruction compounded the error by insuring that the jury first considered the testimony as an
inference of guilt before instructing them to draw no inferences. Instead, the State has only
argued that the instruction had three objectives and that the instruction, combined with voir dire
opportunities, “was [not shown to be] insufficient to eliminate any probability of bias.”
(Respondent’s Brief, p.17.)
Further, while acknowledging that a prosecutorial misconduct is a due process violation,
the State did not separately address the prosecutorial misconduct issue, noting only that the State
did not “encourage or invite the jury to draw an inference from the evidence . . .” (Respondent’s
Brief, p.17.) It appears that the State is implying that because the prosecution did not enhance
the misconduct by committing further misconduct there is no error. Yet, “when an officer of the
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State gives any unsolicited testimony that is gratuitous and prejudicial to the defendant, that
testimony will be imputed to the State for the purposes of determining prosecutorial
misconduct.” State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 61 (2011). The conduct in question, a comment
that Detective Snarr had “[t]ried to interview Mr. Johnson” (Tr., p.726, L.25), was clearly
misconduct attributable the State.
Additionally, the State has asserted that “Johnson has failed to show an overwhelming
probability that the district court’s curative instruction, combined with the opportunity to voir
dire the potential jurors regarding potential bias, was insufficient to eliminate any reasonable
probability of bias.” (Respondent’s Brief, p.17.) The State’s assertion is puzzling as clearly
neither party preventatively discussed this issue in voir dire. This issue at hand involves the
testimony of Detective Snarr, which arose well after voir dire. (Tr., p.726, Ls.17-25.) As such,
questioning during voir dire has no bearing on this issue and certainly does not support the
district court’s decision regarding the motion for mistrial.
Finally, contrary to the State’s assertion otherwise, Mr. Johnson has met his burden to
show that the district court’s failure to grant a mistrial and to provide only a flawed curative
instruction was not harmless error. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010). The jury learning that
Mr. Johnson had invoked his constitutional right to remain silent likely had a stronger effect on
the jury than it would have in a case where the jurors had not already learned that the defendant
had been previously found guilty, as discussed in section I. The limiting instruction did not cure
the prejudicial inference of guilt. The jury had to weigh the credibility of Mr. Johnson, who
asserted his innocence, against other witnesses in his case. It is probable that a jury hearing that
Mr. Johnson had been previously convicted and had invoked his right to remain silent would not
evaluate his testimony in the same way as a jury that had not been exposed to the prejudicial
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information. There is a great danger that the jury did not disregard the stricken testimony, but
that it considered it to Mr. Johnson’s detriment, that it had a continuing impact on the trial, may
have contributed to the verdict, and, ultimately, deprived Mr. Johnson of his right to a fair trial.
As such, it was error for the district court to not declare a mistrial.

III.
The District Court Erred In Denying The Motion For A Mistrial After The Court Erroneously
Allowed Mr. Wilson To Testify With The Aid Of The Report, Despite The Fact That His
Memory Was Not Refreshed By The Contents Of A Report, And After Finding That The State’s
Failure To Disclose The Report Amounted To A Discovery Violation
Mr. Johnson has asserted that the district court abused its discretion in allowing Scott
Wilson, Mr. Johnson’s former employer, to testify about the hours Mr. Johnson worked and the
locations at which he was working on the days surrounding the weekend that Mr. Johnson was
alleged to have committed the charged offenses. Mr. Wilson admitted to having no memories of
the information, yet the district court allowed Mr. Wilson to testify using a time entry report he
had generated at the request of the State to refresh his recollection even though the report did not
actually refresh his recollection. The State committed a discovery violation that prejudiced
Mr. Johnson’s ability to prepare for examination of Mr. Wilson when it failed to disclose the
report to defense counsel prior to Mr. Wilson producing it during his testimony.

Mr. Johnson

maintains that the district court erred in denying the resulting motion for a mistrial.

A.

The Report Was Improperly Used During Mr. Wilson’s Testimony Because It Did Not
Refresh His Recollection And The Resulting Motion For A Mistrial Should Have Been
Granted
Idaho Rule of Evidence 612 provides that a witness may use a writing or object to refresh

his or her memory. Baker v. Boren, 129 Idaho 885, 892 (Ct. App. 1997); I.R.E. 612. A witness
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may not testify directly from the notes, but may use them to assist in recollection. Id. “The court
must ensure that the witness actually has a present recollection and is not to allow inadmissible
evidence to inadvertently slip in for its truth.” Id. (citing 20th Century Wear, Inc., v. Sanmark–
Stardust, Inc., 747 F.2d 81, 93 n.17 (2d Cir.1984)).
Contrary to the State’s assertion that Mr. Wilson’s report refreshed Mr. Wilson’s
recollection, it is clear that it did not. It is important to note that there is a difference between
knowing something at one point, being reminded of the information, and then presently being
able to recall the information versus knowing something at one point, seeing information related
to that information, and still not being able to actually recall the information from a refreshed
previous knowledge. For example, an individual may not be able to recall eating at a restaurant
until someone reminds them of the odd colored walls and distinctive soup they tasted there.
After being reminded of these details, the person may now recall dining at the restaurant. This is
in contrast to an individual not recalling that they ate a restaurant, being presented with a receipt
they signed, acknowledging they must have eaten there, but still having no actual memory of
dining at the restaurant. This case presents a situation like the latter.
When asked how he remembered that Mr. Johnson worked for him on March 22 nd,
Mr. Wilson responded that he had “the hours that he turned in for that day.” (Tr., p.641,
Ls.21-23.) Defense counsel objected commenting that Mr. Wilson’s memory had not been
refreshed, but that he was testifying from his memory of the report he generated earlier in the
day. (Tr., p.641, L.24 – p.642, L.3.) The State attempted to prove that Mr. Wilson’s recollection
had been refreshed through a series of questions:
Q. Have you – Do you, in fact, know at one point in time whether or not
Mr. Johnson worked for you on March 22nd, 2004?
A. Yes.
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Q. Has your memory been refreshed since that time whether or not you
have knowledge of whether or not he worked for you on March 22nd, 2004?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall if Mr. Johnson worked for you on March 22nd, 2004?
A. Yes.
(Tr., p.642, L.14 – p.643, L.3.)
Defense counsel was then allowed to voir dire in aid of objection:
Q. Mr. Wilson, if I can make a distinction here. I know that you have
records or you had records for your business, that you can go back and verify
certain kinds of things. You can see whether or not there is what we sometimes
call a paper trail; correct?
A. That’s correct.
Q. There’s also such a thing as a recollection. Can you remember the 19th
day of March 2004?
A. No.
Q. Can you remember whether you were in the office that day?
A. No.
Q. So you can’t remember whether Mr. Johnson was present in the office
that day?
A. Not from recollection.
Q. And as far as the 22nd of March is concerned, you have no recollection
of your own as to whether he was there on that day; correct?
A. That’s correct.
(Tr., p.643, L.14 – p.644, L.9.)
It was clear, when the district court ruled on the objection, that Mr. Wilson was never
able to remember the information contained in the report, regardless of whether he knew it at one
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point or not. As such, the district court did not reach its decision through an exercise of reason
because the report did not refresh Mr. Wilson’s recollection and Mr. Wilson merely provided
testimony from his memory of the contents of the report.
The State also asserts that Mr. Johnson incorrectly cited to “post-ruling testimony” in
support of the argument that Mr. Wilson’s memory was not refreshed because it was not
“presented to the district court in support of the objection . . .” (Respondent’s Brief, p.24, n.5.)
The testimony referenced includes the following:
Q. And that, in fact, is the program that you consulted, you say, to refresh
your recollection?
A. Yes.
Q. But consulting that program and the data that was contained in the
program didn’t give you a present recollection of seeing David Johnson in the
office on the 19th of March, did it?
A. No.
Q. Nor did it give you a recollection – a present recollection of seeing him
in the office on the 22nd of March; correct?
A. That’s correct.
Q. You are assuming that the data entry is accurate. And that’s what
you’re relying upon, the data entry, not any memory that you have personally.
A. Yes, that’s correct.
(Tr., p.695, Ls.6-21.) Had Mr. Johnson raised only the issue regarding the district court’s abuse
of discretion in allowing Mr. Wilson to testify concerning his alleged refreshed recollection, this
may be a valid point. However, Mr. Johnson presented this issue as a part of a larger issue, the
denial of his motion for mistrial. As this Court is well aware: “[T]he question on appeal is not
whether the trial judge reasonably exercised his discretion in light of circumstances existing
when the mistrial motion was made. Rather, the question must be whether the event which
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precipitated the motion for mistrial represented reversible error when viewed in the context of
the full record.” State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571 (2007) (quoting State v. Sandoval-Tena, 138
Idaho 908, 912 (2003) (quoting State v. Shepherd, 124 Idaho 54, 57 (Ct. App. 1993) (quoting
State v. Urquhart, 105 Idaho 92, 95 (Ct. App. 1983))). As such, this evidence can and must be
considered in relation to this claim of error.
Additionally, the State has argued that any possible error is harmless because this
evidence was “ultimately a very minor part of the trial.”

(Respondent’s Brief, pp.24-25.)

Mr. Johnson asserts that this evidence was not minor, and opportunity to commit the crime was a
critical issue that was fervently contested by the defense. The issue of timing and opportunity to
commit the alleged offenses was a portion of more than half of the witnesses’ testimony
including Scott Wilson (Tr., p.623, L.1 – p.662, L.11, p.686, L.2 – p.701, L.16); Jeremy Kiesig, a
former co-worker of Mr. Johnson (Tr., p.587, L.12 – p.602, L.19); Tammy Lynard, a former coworker of Mr. Johnson (Tr., p.604, L.15 – p.613, L.5); Michelle Johnson, the alleged victim’s
mother (Tr., p.905, L.17 – p.1048, L.19); Detective Snarr (Tr., p.746, L.25 – p.751, L.19, p.1122,
L.2 – p.1138, L.13), Richard Smith, the alleged victim’s grandfather (Tr., p.807, L.4 – p.814,
L.13, p.821, L.12 – p.841, L.15, p.849, L.5 – p.856, L.23); Diane Peterson, the defendant’s sister
(Tr., p.1092, L.4 – p.1112, L.6); and Mr. Johnson himself (Tr., p.1143, L.13 – p.1149, L.4,
p.1172, L.9 – p.1201, L.13.) As such, opportunity to commit the charged crimes was the crucial
question in this case and Mr. Wilson’s testimony, providing exact dates, times, and client
information, was critically important.

The erroneous admission of the testimony had a

continuing impact on the trial and the jurors’ ultimate decision in the case and, as a result,
deprived Mr. Johnson of a fair trial.
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B.

The State Committed A Discovery Violation When It Failed To Provide Defense Counsel
A Copy Of Mr. Wilson’s Time Entry Report And The Resulting Motion For A Mistrial
Should Have Been Granted
The State has asserted that there was no discovery violation. (Respondent’s Brief, p.26,

n.6.)

However, as argued in the Appellant’s Brief, the facts support the district court’s

conclusion that there was a discovery violation. Mr. Wilson testified that the prosecution had
specifically told him to look up the time entry information. (Tr., p.661, Ls.21-24.) The district
court noted that, “[t]he . . . more troubling question for me is that this information was generated
just in the last few days, not disclosed to the defense. If it has the relevancy and the power that
the State says that it does, that actually increases the concern that I’ve got about this particular
information.” (Tr., p.668, Ls.15-21.) The district court found that the failure to disclose the
report constituted a discovery violation “in form, if not in substance” because, by the witnesses
testimony, the report “was requested by either the State’s attorney or Detective Snarr.” (Tr.,
p.677, Ls.3-11.)
Additionally, the State has asserted that Mr. Johnson has “not expressed any nonspeculative basis for concluding that he was prejudiced by the amount of time he has to respond
to the report generated by Wilson.” (Respondent’s Brief, p.27.)

In support of the argument, the

State claims that because Mr. Wilson had already done all the work to generate the report, there
was nothing else that defense counsel would have needed to do. (Respondent’s Brief, p.27.)
However, Mr. Johnson was not required to accept the report, a summary of other records, as
submitted and should have been given the opportunity to examine the records from which the
report was created. The report was generated from a time tracking system called Bridge Track, a
system that Mr. Wilson was no longer using, and to create the report he had run a SQL query to
pull information regarding the dates in question. (Tr., p.629, L.12 – p.631, L.6.) As such, in
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order to examine the records to determine if the report was correct, Mr. Johnson would have had
to examine the computer records and the Bridge Track system.
In light of this information and the related objection regarding Mr. Wilson’s recollection,
defense counsel made a motion for mistrial. (Tr., p.668, Ls.2-4.) In support of the motion,
counsel noted that “we have no practical way of examining the primary records from which this
document was generated in a meaningful way.” (Tr., p.662, Ls.23-25.) The court then offered
defense counsel an opportunity to examine Mr. Wilson’s records, continue with the trial and recall him at a later time, but noted that it was “reluctant to have this trial go on forever” and
“reluctant to have the jury continue to be out for long periods of time.” (Tr., p.679, Ls.7-14,
p.680 Ls.8-17.)
Defense counsel told the district court that allowing them to look at the records and report
would not be feasible at this point in time. He noted that he was staying in a hotel, was not a
computer expert, that there was no time to conduct further examination of the time reporting
system, and that there would not be enough time to sift through the information especially while
continuing with trial. (Tr., p.680, L.18 – p.681, L.24.) Counsel reminded the district court that:
And, again, I have a document that I now have to deal with because I
believe that the document, in effect, is in evidence. The jury has heard not just
that Mr. Johnson was present at work on those days. They’ve heard how many
hours he was there on those days. So I then am forced to cross examine a witness
based upon a document that I did not see until the witness himself was actually
testifying and the primary source of which I have had no opportunity to
investigate. I’m going to have to do that, but I think that has put me at a very
large disadvantage. I think it flies in the face of what Rule 16 is supposed to do.
(Tr., p.681, L.25 – p.682, L.12.)
The district court then again offered to stop Mr. Wilson’s testimony and have him come
back at a later date. (Tr., p.683, Ls.4-25.) Defense counsel again turned down the offer noting
that, “I am simply not able to conduct investigation and further discovery inquiry during the
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course of a trial. And what the Court is suggesting – I mean, if we had just learned about this
even last week, I think what the Court is suggesting would have been viable. It’s not now. So I
appreciate the opportunity, but I don’t view it as being of comfort or assistance to the defense.”
(Tr., p.684, Ls.6-15.)
Therefore, it is clear that Mr. Johnson’s ability to conduct research and fully prepare to
rebut the evidence offered was devastated by the late disclosure. The district court was unwilling
to provide a break in the proceedings to complete the necessary investigation, offering only to
continue the trial and re-call Mr. Wilson later. In light of the inability of counsel to properly
cross-examine Mr. Wilson, investigate either the report’s accuracy or the records the report was
created from, and the significance of the testimony, the discovery violation and improper
presentation of Mr. Wilson’s testimony amounted to a depravation of Mr. Johnson’s right to a
fair trial. As such, the district court erred in denying the motion for mistrial.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Johnson respectfully requests that his judgments of conviction be vacated and his
case remanded for further proceedings.
DATED this 16th day of June, 2017.

/s/
ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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